Foresight
The gap between what is announced and what is built.
For 2050, published scenarios do not describe the same world: DNV forecasts hydrogen at 5% of the energy mix, while IRENA’s 1.5°C pathway requires 523 Mt of clean hydrogen a year. The gap is not about technology — it is about cost, offtake and who pays for the infrastructure.
Where the curve actually stands
Committed clean hydrogen investment has reached $130 billion across 579 projects that have taken a final investment decision, are under construction or operate — 6.9 Mtpa of committed capacity (Hydrogen Council, June 2026). The IEA counts 27 Mt a year of low-emissions production announced for 2030, 10 Mt less than a year earlier; only 4.3 Mt is committed, against almost 1 Mt produced in 2025. The two institutions do not measure the same thing: capacity for the Council, expected production for the IEA.
Financing
In 2023 the World Bank had approved $1.65 billion of renewable hydrogen loans and proposed a 10 GW clean hydrogen initiative. In April 2026 the EU Hydrogen Mechanism closed its first matching round: 265 supply projects from 33 countries, 45 offtake projects. De-risking, more than the resource, is the missing piece for the Southern Mediterranean.
Costs
Electrolysers cost USD 820/kW in China and USD 2,200/kW elsewhere in 2025; the IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) brings them to USD 680 and 1,700/kW by 2030. In that scenario renewable hydrogen falls below USD 2/kg in parts of northern China and to about USD 3.5/kg in some European locations. IRENA (2023) puts the European average at USD 4.5–6/kg.
Electricity
Gartner expects data centres to use 565 TWh in 2026, 26% more than the 447 TWh of 2025, and over 1,200 TWh by 2030 (forecast of 10 June 2026). Clean molecules compete for the same electrons — siting and additionality decide.
Sources: Hydrogen Council, Global Hydrogen Compass 2026 · IEA, Global Hydrogen Review 2026, p. 11, 81, 111–112 · World Bank, press release, 17 November 2023 · European Commission (DG ENER), 29 April 2026 · IRENA, Power to hydrogen: status · Gartner, press release, 10 June 2026
The scenarios, side by side
Each entry states its author, its year, its type and its perimeter. A forecast says what is expected; a pathway says what a goal requires; a project count says what has been announced. Where two institutions disagree, the disagreement is the finding.
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Global Hydrogen Review 2026
Project count · Announced projects, not a forecast; costs under the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS)
The announced pipeline for 2030 shrank by 10 Mt in a year, to 27 Mt; only 4.3 Mt is committed.
More than 100 GW of announced electrolysis could lose any chance of operating by 2030 if investment decisions are not taken before the end of 2027. A project count is not a forecast: read the scenario tables of the edition you cite, and never mix editions.
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Global Hydrogen Flows: 2023 Update
Scenario · Further Acceleration — a 1.9 °C outcome
Clean hydrogen demand above 40 Mt a year by 2030, nearly 20 Mt of it moved over long distances.
Long-distance trade grows to about 100 Mt a year by 2040 and about 200 Mt by 2050. Trade would save some USD 4 trillion of investment compared with a limited-trade world, for about USD 70 billion a year of transport and conversion infrastructure by 2050. A scenario that still misses 1.5 °C, not a forecast.
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Innovation landscape for smart electrification — 1.5°C Scenario
Normative pathway · IRENA 1.5°C Scenario
125 Mt of hydrogen a year by 2030 and 523 Mt by 2050 — 94% of global hydrogen production — on a 1.5 °C path.
Green and blue together; electrolysers of up to 350 GW in 2030 and roughly 5,000 GW in 2050; USD 170 billion of investment a year through 2050. A normative pathway says what a 1.5 °C world requires, not what will happen: compare it with DNV’s forecast, not with the IEA’s project count.
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Hydrogen Forecast to 2050
Forecast · DNV best-estimate forecast
Hydrogen at 0.5% of the energy mix in 2030 and 5% in 2050.
3,100 GW of electrolysers on that path; 72% of 2050 production from electricity; USD 6.8 trillion of production investment to 2050. The forecast puts steel, industrial heat, maritime and aviation derivatives at the centre, and does not place intercontinental shipment of pure hydrogen there.
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European Hydrogen Backbone
Infrastructure vision · Network plan of the gas transmission operators
58,000 km of hydrogen network by 2040, about 60% repurposed from gas.
A network plan is not a financing commitment and not a final investment decision. The North Africa to Europe corridor appears in the plan; whether it is built depends on offtake contracts that do not yet exist at scale.
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Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation: The Hydrogen Factor
Analytical framework
Hydrogen trade creates new interdependencies rather than ending dependence: countries with abundant low-cost renewable power could become producers, and fossil fuel exporters could diversify through it.
The framework weighs technology leadership and equipment manufacturing, certification and common standards, trade and investment interdependence, and the place of developing countries. It is the most useful lens for a North African producer, because it asks who captures the value rather than how much volume moves.
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Hydrogen: Not a solution for gas-fired turbines
Critical analysis
Plants sold as “hydrogen-capable” will run almost entirely on methane for at least the next ten years.
A 20% hydrogen blend cuts a turbine’s emissions by no more than about 7%. It matters for North Africa because repurposed gas infrastructure is central to the corridor case, and because the same argument applies to blending targets and to blue hydrogen marketed as transitional.
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Iron ore quality a potential headwind to green steelmaking
Critical analysis · Ore deficit: BloombergNEF outlook cited by IEEFA
Hydrogen demand in steel is capped by the ore, not by the hydrogen.
Direct reduction ideally needs ore of 67% iron or more; Vale expects ore above 66% Fe to stay at just 3% of seaborne supply through 2030 (IEEFA, 2022). BloombergNEF, cited by IEEFA in March 2026, sees a deficit of DR-grade ore of 15 Mt a year by 2030, widening to 133 Mt by 2040. A steel-hydrogen forecast that skips the ore constraint overstates its case.
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Hydrogen Demand and Cost Dynamics
Literature review
Publishes ranges rather than a point forecast: 150 to 600 Mt of hydrogen demand in 2050 across the studies reviewed, at USD 1.5–5/kg.
Useful as a discipline: the paper traces most of the cost spread to the price of electricity and the electrolyser’s full-load hours. When institutions disagree on 2050 demand, look first at those assumptions.
Observed first, then projected
World Bank, IMF, World Economic Forum, OECD, IRENA and the European Commission, read for the countries that matter to a North African hydrogen hub. Observed values come first; projections follow in their own tables, each with the scenario that produced it.
Energy and economy in the focus countries
| Country or group | Access to electricity (% of population, 2024) | Electricity from natural gas (% of output, 2024) | Renewable electricity (% of output, 2021) | Net energy imports (% of energy use, 2024) | CO₂ per person (t, excl. land use, 2024) | GDP per person (current USD, 2025) | Energy Transition Index 2025 (rank of 118, score) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tunisia | 100 | 93.9 | 2.8 | 66.0 | 2.6 | 4,657 | 62 (54.6) |
| Morocco | 100 | 9.6 | 19.3 | 93.9 | 1.8 | 4,672 | 70 (53.7) |
| Algeria | 100 | 99.0 | 0.9 | −119.3 | 4.0 | 6,051 | 89 (50.7) |
| Egypt | 100 | 76.9 | 12.2 | 26.4 | 2.5 | 3,086 | 74 (53.1) |
| Mauritania | 52.2 | 0 (2021) | 19.4 | — | 1.0 | 2,198 | not covered |
| Namibia | 59.3 | 0 (2021) | 93.4 | 61.8 | 1.2 | 4,876 | 64 (54.4) |
| European Union | 100 | 16.9 (2025) | 37.8 | 62.5 (2023) | 5.5 | 47,089 | — |
| World | 91.9 | 28.7 (2025) | 27.8 | 14.6 (2023) | 4.7 | 14,406 | global average 56.9 |
World Bank, World Development Indicators (CC BY 4.0), indicators EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS, EG.ELC.NGAS.ZS, EG.ELC.RNEW.ZS, EG.IMP.CONS.ZS, EN.GHG.CO2.PC.CE.AR5, NY.GDP.PCAP.CD: most recent value, database updated on 8 October 2026; when the year differs from the column, it is shown next to the value. A negative net-import share means a net exporter (Algeria). Energy Transition Index: World Economic Forum, Fostering Effective Energy Transition 2025, Table 1; Mauritania is not covered; Tunisia ranked 89th in 2024 (TAP, 26 June 2025). Consulted on 24 October 2026.JSONCSV
Global markers, latest editions
| Indicator | Value | Year | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Low-emissions hydrogen production | almost 1 Mt (+20 %) | 2025 | IEA, GHR 2026, p. 11, 81 |
| Installed electrolysis capacity | > 4 GW (doubled in a year) | end-2025 | IEA, GHR 2026, p. 12, 81 |
| Committed clean hydrogen investment (FID or beyond) | USD 130 bn · 579 projects · 6.9 Mtpa | June 2026 | Hydrogen Council, Compass 2026 |
| EU Hydrogen Mechanism, first round | 265 supply projects from 33 countries (16 in the EU) · 45 offtake projects · 87 % of suppliers received interest | April 2026 | European Commission, 29 Apr. 2026 |
| World Bank renewable hydrogen loans approved | USD 1.65 bn | 2023 | World Bank, 17 Nov. 2023 |
| New renewable projects cheaper than any new fossil alternative | 91 % | 2024 | IRENA, Renewable power generation costs in 2024, p. 5 |
| Global weighted average cost of new renewable power | solar PV USD 0.043/kWh · onshore wind 0.034 · offshore wind 0.079 | 2024 | IRENA, Renewable power generation costs in 2024, p. 3, 6, 7 |
| Government support for fossil fuels | USD 916 bn (USD 1,031 bn in 2023) | 2024 | OECD and IEA, Dec. 2025 |
| Data-centre electricity consumption | 447 TWh | 2025 | Gartner, 10 June 2026 |
| Energy Transition Index | 77 of 118 countries improved · average score +1.1 % | 2025 | WEF, Fostering Effective Energy Transition 2025 |
ProjectedGrowth and public debt: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2026
| Country or group | Real GDP growth 2026 (%) | Real GDP growth 2027 (%) | Gross government debt 2026 (% of GDP) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tunisia | 2.4 | 2.0 | 86.1 |
| Morocco | 4.5 | 4.2 | 66.6 |
| Algeria | 3.8 | 3.2 | 51.8 |
| Egypt | 5.1 | 4.7 | 84.0 |
| Mauritania | 4.4 | 4.4 | 38.3 |
| Namibia | 2.0 | 2.7 | 67.5 |
| European Union | 1.4 | 1.4 | 83.6 |
| World | 3.1 | 3.4 | — |
| Middle East and Central Asia (IMF group) | −0.3 | 6.3 | — |
| Sub-Saharan Africa (IMF group) | 4.5 | 4.5 | — |
IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2026 (DataMapper, data of 8 October 2026). Projections of the IMF staff baseline; 2026 is the current year and remains a projection. Middle East and Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are IMF country groups. Consulted on 24 October 2026.JSONCSV
ProjectedScenarios, forecasts, project counts and targets
| Indicator | Value | Horizon | Type | Scenario or basis | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low-emissions hydrogen production announced | 27 Mt (37 Mt a year earlier) | 2030 | Project count | All announced projects — a project pipeline, not a forecast | IEA, GHR 2026, p. 11, 81 |
| Committed low-emissions production | 4.3 Mt (could exceed 6 Mt with FIDs in 2026–2027) | 2030 | Project count | Projects operating, under construction or at FID | IEA, GHR 2026, p. 81 |
| Electrolyser CAPEX | USD 680/kW (China) · USD 1,700/kW (rest of world); 2025: 820 and 2,200 | 2030 | Scenario | IEA Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) | IEA, GHR 2026, p. 111, Figure 3.20 note |
| Cost of renewable hydrogen | < USD 2/kg in parts of northern China · USD 3–4/kg in the Middle East, India, Chile · ≈ USD 3.5/kg in some European locations | 2030 | Scenario | IEA Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) | IEA, GHR 2026, p. 112 |
| Clean hydrogen demand achievable | 11 Mtpa, of which ≈ 6 firmed by enacted policy | 2030 | Forecast | Hydrogen Council demand assessment (June 2026) | Hydrogen Council, Compass 2026 |
| Hydrogen production | 125 Mt (2030) · 523 Mt (2050), 94 % of global production | 2030 · 2050 | Scenario | IRENA 1.5°C Scenario — what the goal requires, not a forecast | IRENA, Power to hydrogen: status |
| Electrolyser capacity and investment | up to 350 GW (2030) · ≈ 5,000 GW (2050) · USD 170 bn a year | 2030 · 2050 | Scenario | IRENA 1.5°C Scenario | IRENA, Power to hydrogen: status |
| Long-distance hydrogen trade | nearly 20 Mt (2030) · ≈ 100 Mt (2040) · ≈ 200 Mt (2050); USD 4 tn saved vs limited trade | 2030 · 2040 · 2050 | Scenario | Hydrogen Council and McKinsey, Further Acceleration (1.9 °C) | Hydrogen Council and McKinsey, 2023, p. 4, 5, 12, 15, 16 |
| Hydrogen in the energy mix | 0.5 % (2030) · 5 % (2050) | 2030 · 2050 | Forecast | DNV best-estimate forecast (2022) | DNV, 14 June 2022 |
| Data-centre electricity consumption | 565 TWh (2026, +26 %) · > 1,200 TWh (2030) | 2026 · 2030 | Forecast | Gartner forecast (June 2026) | Gartner, 10 June 2026 |
| World real GDP growth | 3.1 % (2026) · 3.4 % (2027) | 2026 · 2027 | Forecast | IMF staff baseline, World Economic Outlook October 2026 | IMF, WEO October 2026 |
| Deficit of DR-grade iron ore | 15 Mt a year (2030) · 133 Mt a year (2040) | 2030 · 2040 | Forecast | BloombergNEF outlook, cited by IEEFA (March 2026) | IEEFA, 19 Mar. 2026 |
| European hydrogen network | 58,000 km, ≈ 60 % repurposed gas pipelines | 2040 | Plan | European Hydrogen Backbone vision (gas TSOs), not an investment decision | GIE, 20 Nov. 2024 |
| EU renewable hydrogen target | 10 Mt produced in the EU + 10 Mt imported | 2030 | Target | REPowerEU policy target (indicative), not a projection | European Commission, REPowerEU (2022) |
What we track
Nine indicators, each with the institution that publishes it and how often it moves. A figure without a source and a date is an opinion.
| Indicator | Definition | Published by | Frequency |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conversion from announcement to final investment decision | Capacity at FID divided by announced capacity, by year and region. | IEA Hydrogen Projects Database; S&P Global; Wood Mackenzie Lens | annual, quarterly with commercial data |
| Operating electrolyser capacity | MW in operation, under construction, at FID and merely announced, kept as four separate columns. | IEA Global Hydrogen Review and Projects Database | annual, with project-level updates |
| Levelled cost of hydrogen | USD per kg, stated with electricity price, load factor, capital cost, cost of capital and water. | IRENA, BloombergNEF, IEA | annual edition or scenario |
| Utilisation | MWh actually produced against theoretical full-load hours, keeping technical availability and renewable load factor apart. | project databases with IEA, IRENA and BNEF assumptions | annual, monthly where operator data exists |
| The clean-to-fossil cost gap | Levelled cost of low-carbon hydrogen minus the cost of fossil hydrogen, with carbon and transport included. | IEA, IRENA, BloombergNEF, Hydrogen Council | annual or quarterly |
| Firm offtake | Mt a year covered by binding agreements against Mt a year covered by memoranda only. | IEA Global Hydrogen Review; S&P Global; Hydrogen Council | annual |
| Ambition against public support | Targeted demand minus the volume actually mandated or subsidised. | Hydrogen Council and McKinsey; European Commission; national policy | annual |
| Import dependence and supplier concentration | Share of imports, concentration across suppliers, dependence on a single corridor or a single derivative. | IRENA, IEA, European Hydrogen Backbone, customs data | annual |
| Delay and cancellation | Projects delayed, downsized or cancelled as a share of the pipeline. | IEA, IEEFA, S&P Global, Wood Mackenzie | quarterly to annual |
How we publish a figure
- State the year, the perimeter, the unit, the project status and the date the figure was taken.
- Do not call all low-carbon hydrogen green. Keep renewable, fossil with capture, by-product and unabated separate.
- Do not add Mt of hydrogen to Mt of hydrogen equivalent, nor GW of electrolyser capacity to Mt a year of production.
- For Tunisia and North Africa, keep resource potential, policy target, memorandum, front-end design, final investment decision and operation in six different fields.
- Date the scenario. A 2020 price and a 2022 forecast are evidence about their authors, not about today.
- Where a figure comes from a commercial database, say so and keep a public source as a cross-check.
